In Lebanon, people keep saying that the social contract is broken. But is it true?
Let’s dig in.
At its core, the social contract in Lebanon is an unwritten agreement that aims to maintain peace between the 18 religious communities.
It is based on a sectarian power-sharing formula, where government positions, civil service jobs, and parliamentary seats are distributed along religious lines. This is designed to prevent sectarian dominance and maintain a fragile peace between the various communities.
Lebanon’s social contract has been shaped by 2 critical agreements, both of them informal.
The National Pact (1943)
It is an informal understanding between Bishara al-Khoury, a Maronite Christian, and Riad al-Solh, a Sunni Muslim, upon gaining independence from France, which put Lebanon under its mandate after World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
At that time, Maronites and Sunnis were the two largest religious communities. The agreement was a compromise that shaped Lebanon’s political identity and structure:
- Christians agreed to renounce seeking foreign protection, particularly from France, which had historically been a protector of Lebanese Christians.
- Muslims agreed to recognize Lebanon as an independent nation with its own borders, instead of pursuing unity with the broader Arab world (specifically Syria).
Furthermore, both men agreed that
- The president would always be a Maronite Christian.
- The prime minister would be a Sunni Muslim.
- The speaker of parliament would be a Shia Muslim.
At that time already, this agreement was criticized.
Georges Naccache, a journalist and diplomat, famously wrote in 1949 : “Un Etat n’est pas la somme de deux impuissances — et deux négations ne feront jamais une nation” : “A state is not the sum of two impotences – and two negations will never make a nation.”
The Taif Agreement (1989)
It ended Lebanon’s 15-year civil war (1975-1990). It redistributed some of the powers held by the Maronite president to the Sunni prime minister and Shia speaker of parliament. The agreement also formalized the principle of equal power-sharing between Christians and Muslims in parliament,shifting from the previous 6:5 ratio favoring Christians.
The Doha agreement (2008)
Another shift in the social contract came after a political crisis in 2008, with the Doha Agreement, which granted more powers to the Shiite community and its allies.
These agreements exist in parallel to the written Lebanese Constitution, which acknowledges the existence of the different confessions, and gives them power over matters of personal life. But the Constitution also outlines in its preamble : “The abolition of political confessionalism shall be a basic national goal and shall be achieved according to a staged plan.”
This is far from being achieved.
Is the Lebanese social contract broken?
Lebanese writer Gebran Khalil Gebran (1883-1931) already believed in the 1930s that the Lebanese social contract was broken. In his book “The Garden of the Prophet”, he summed up the social contract crisis by saying:
“Pity the nation divided into fragments, each fragment deeming itself a nation.”
In a 2020 study, researcher Markus Loewe interviewed 1,503 people residing in Lebanon (500 of them non-nationals). 56.3 % of people said that there is currently no reason to be loyal to the government, which is a clear sign that the social contract is lacking.
Indeed, the Lebanese social contract, while intended to prevent conflict, has led to political stalemate and corruption, as leaders often prioritized sectarian interests over national ones. This exacerbated Lebanon’s economic crises and deepened public dissatisfaction.
Furthermore, over the decades, the Lebanese population has changed, and it is now estimated that Muslims are outnumbering Christians. However, the last official census dates back to… 1932. Since then, no new census has been conducted, largely due to fears that updated figures could reignite sectarian tensions and potentially trigger a new civil war. But this demographic shift has put pressure on the original power-sharing formula, leading to calls for reform.
Last but not least, the 2023-2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon between October and November 2024 (with Israel still occupying certain areas and conducting regular airstrikes until now), revived sectarian tensions. The Shiite community in particular, having borne the brunt of the war, with many living in the South and subsequently being bombed and displaced, has faced scapegoating due to its perceived support for Hezbollah.
In summary, Lebanon’s social contract is a unique arrangement designed to manage sectarian diversity, but it is also a source of political gridlock and public frustration. Whether this contract can be reformed or replaced in the future remains an open question.
